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The emergence of competition as the result of deregulation coupled
with a dramatic shift away from cost-based reimbursement has profound
implications for the future of the health care system. This "new com-
petition" represents a trend propelled by powerful economic forces
rooted in the escalation of health care costs and in a wider trend
toward deregulation, so it is very unlikely to be reversed.
This paper characterizes the nature and source of the restructuring
underway and develops the rationale of how the new competition is sup-
posed to work to increase health effectiveness while bringing down
costs. It considers the needs for health vouchers as the working poor
are squeezed out by increasing competition and the major implications
for hospitals, and health professionals as they seek to plan ahead.
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THE "NEW COMPETITION" IN HEALTH CARE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Walter W. McMahon
Powerful economic forces are transforming health care delivery, a
transformation that is becoming the second major revolution affecting
health care in modern times. It is a reaction to the first, an
extraordinarily rapid diffusion since 1945 of health insurance and
third-party reimbursement, unfortunately accompanied by escalating
health care costs. The rapid expansion of private health insurance was
followed in 1965 by public health insurance, through Medicare and Medi-
caid, which piggy-backed on the private Blue Cross Blue Shield cost-
based reimbursement methods. This first health care revolution and its
reimbursement methods encouraged high usage and even permitted padding
to creep into health care costs and billing.
It is the escalation of health care costs that has fueled the
second revolution, a radical change in the way in which hospitals and
physicians are reimbursed, coupled with deregulation of the health sec-
tor and the emergence of competition. This "new competition" is the
result of efforts by the major buyers of health care which are the
large employers, the Federal Government, and the state governments, to
contain health care costs. These buyers are the ones that must bear
most of the health care bills. They now negotiate in advance to
contract for the price of a package of health care services under con-
ditions of increasing competition among providers. The use of these
more competitive contracts is extremely likely to continue so long as
health care costs continue to rise. It is a new kind of competition
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that has profound implications for the way in which health care ser-
vices will be provided and for the structure of the health care system
of the future.
This chapter explores the implications for the future of the health
care system of the emergence of the "new competition" which combines
deregulation with negotiation in advance for "bundles" of health care
services. It is to the advantage of providers to consider the nature
of the change and the implications as they plan ahead. The development
of health policies at the state level and by employer benefit plans
also will proceed better if influenced by an awareness of the economic
forces at work and of the economic implications of current trends. To
enhance this awareness, the chapter first characterizes the escalation
in health care costs that has motivated the continuing interest by
government and business in attaining greater efficiency. It explains
how cost-based retrospective reimbursement by insurers contributes to
the escalation of health care costs, including those resulting from
expensive novelties in medical technology and from higher hospital
utilization rates. It then describes the forms of the new competition
emerging in health care and considers the rationale how competition is
supposed to work to bring down costs. As the implications for the
structure of the industry are developed, the chapter suggests some of
the forms that a sound competitive health care policy should take to
meet the needs of marginal groups, such as the working poor or the
elderly, and to keep them from falling through the gaps in the system.
Finally, the discussion turns to some of the implications for the
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activities and training of health care professionals as they become
more involved with management decisions and grow more concerned with
efficient use of resources.
I. UPHEAVAL, CHANGE, AND CHALLENGE
Deregulation, moves toward more competition, and shifts away from
retrospective reimbursement are all producing dramatic change. A
description of the economic forces causing this change will set the
stage for a description of its nature.
Health Care Costs—A Few Facts
To appraise the scope of this force, it is necessary to look
briefly at the current level and trend of health care costs. Health
care costs had reached 10.8 percent of Gross National Product by 1983
as compared to only 4.4 percent of the nation's output in 1950. In
recent years, health expenditures in real terms have been growing at
2
four times the nation's growth rate. In absolute dollars, health
care costs come to $6,936 each year for an average family of four, and
more than this for those whose family income is above average. Also
in absolute dollars, the total health care bill in the United States
has increased eleven-fold since 1960.
The Chief Administrator of the Federal Health Care Financing
Administration, Carolyne Davis (1983, p. 13), estimates that 58 per-
cent of the increase is due to the rising price per unit of physician
and hospital services. The hospital room rate for example, rose 457
percent just from 1967 until 1983, and physicians' fees by 227 per-
cent, but during the same time the overall Consumer Price Index rose
189 percent. Various regulatory approaches, such as the application
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of price "guidelines" during the Carter Administration and, more
recently, the freeze on physicians' Medicare reimbursement rates, have
not succeeded very well, in that the rate of increase has remained
overall at about double the nation's inflation rate.
At the individual level, Senator Metzenbaum from Ohio who investi-
gated hospital prices, cites routine hospital charges of $275 a day
for a double room; many additional charges can easily bring the average
charges to $1,000.00 a day for a short hospital stay. Physician
charges are normally in addition to the hospital bill. As more states
collect and publicize rates paid by third party payors for each city
and each hospital, the public is becoming increasingly aware of local
prices. This is not to suggest that "the public" is likely to do much
about this since the insurance company, Medicare, or Medicaid normally
pay the bill; but it does suggest that the public is likely to be more
permissive as governmental units and employer groups begin to act.
The Forces Propelling Change
The moves toward the new competition, consisting of both deregula-
tion and negotiation on the prices of bundles of services beforehand
(prospective reimbursement), continue to be motivated by these sharp
increases in health care costs. Various political coalitions have
emerged to propel continuing change. These include business employers,
who are concerned about the large and rising costs that they must bear
for their employee health benefit plans; state governments, which are
deeply concerned about the rising cost of Medicaid, and the Federal
Government (and the retirees it serves through Medicare) who are con-
cerned that Social Security trust fund remain solvent. Though the
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moves toward competition began at the Federal level, employers and
state governments increasingly recognize their joint interests in
containing costs, and state-level restructuring of the health care
delivery system is therefore becoming common. So long as the price
increases continue, Federal, state, and employer motivations to act are
strengthened.
The Basic Problem With Incentives—Leading to More Change
Cost-based reimbursement without prior agreement on the total
price for the necessary bundle of treatments provides perverse incen-
tives, inducing providers to run up the costs. Retrospective reim-
bursement rewards those who pad the costs with more revenue and
penalizes those who seek to be efficient and to not waste resources.
This disincentive to be efficient is now widely recognized among
researchers into the economics of the operation of our health care
4
system as a primary cause of escalating health care costs.
When retrospective reimbursement is coupled with third party
payment—95 percent of those who require health care services do not
pay their own bill—health care users lack, incentive to police the
costs. After all, "the insurance company pays," or "Medicare pays,"
so why bother? Third party payors include the Federal Government,
which reimburses for Medicare patients; the state governments which
still reimburse for most Medicaid services on the old retrospective
basis (and often in costly emergency room and Medicaid-mill settings);
and private insurers, such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield. In virtually
all other spheres of economic activity, the final buyer agrees on the
the price beforehand.
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Cost-based retrospective reimbursement furthermore offers incen-
tives to prescribe unnecessary services. Studies have found that
getting a second opinion about the need for surgery, for example,
results in the medical opinion that the surgery is unnecessary 50 per-
cent of the time, and as a result, many insurers are now requiring a
6
second opinion before they will agree to reimburse. Extra days in the
hospital for a Blue Cross/Blue Shield patient helps to keep the beds
filled up (at a time when prospective reimbursement has limited this
practice for Medicare and Medicaid patients, leaving hospitals with
excess capacity). With some unnecessary utilization and cost shifting
to privately insured patients, cost of the traditional Blue Cross/Blue
Shield cost based reimbursement insurance to employer health-benefit
plans continues to rise.
Another important situation where cost-based reimbursement con-
tributes to rising costs is in the acquisition of expensive high-
technology equipment. In most industries the producer has an incentive
to purchase new equipment that will do the job as well or better and
will save on labor and other costs. In health care, however, the full
cost of the new equipment can be passed on to the third party payor as
part of the patient's bill. The kind of equipment purchased can there-
fore indifferently be cost-increasing or cost-reducing. Furthermore,
the hospital's image with physicians and therefore its ability to fill
beds may be enhanced by having the most recent, most expensive machines
readily available. The result is purchase of too many of the new
machines of the type that increase rather than reduce costs.
-7-
A final illustration of how overutilization under third-party
restrospective reimbursement provides weak incentives to manage costs
Q
is the example of standing orders for lab tests. More lab tests will
always reveal more than fewer lab tests, of course; but tests have
diminishing returns. At some point there must be a balance between the
additional information yielded, and the additional cost, not just to
the third party payor, but also in the form of the cost of the
patient's time and other risks.
Deregulation
To turn to the changes now taking place, it is important to
recognize that health care is an industry in which entry is heavily
regulated. There are minimum money capital requirements for health
care plans; extensive state licensure requirements for physicians,
nurses, and other providers; minimum quality requirements; state laws
requiring certificates of need for new hospitals, certificates of need
9
for new high-tech equipment, and so forth.
But things are changing very fast. The current Federal Admini-
stration is heavily committed to fostering competition as a means
of containing escalating health care costs and encouraging greater
efficiency in the use of health resources. Disillusioned with
regulation as a means to these ends, like the preceding Administration,
the Reagan Administration is rapidly dismantling certif icate-of-need
requirements and is cutting back on the funding for HSA planning agen-
cies. The courts have joined the trend by holding in a recent Kansas
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City case that state certificate of need laws bar entry and foster
monopoly in violation of the antitrust laws. Similarly, the Supreme
Court in Goldfarb v. the Virginia State Bar has held that self-
regulation by the "learned professions" is not exempt from antitrust
scrutiny. These moves toward deregulation and competition have a
significant effect in shifting the locus of economic power in health
care from the self-regulation by the health care industry, especially
by the American Medical Association, and by county medical societies,
to the demand side and to the discipline of the market.
Other aspects of deregulation and the moves toward more com-
petition include the recent information that the Administration will
no longer enforce the regulations that reguire hospitals that have
received Hill-Burton funds for expansion to care for their share of
12
the poor. One result is the widely publicized dumping of patients
whose funds have run out by many not-for-profit hospitals as they face
competitive pressures. "Dumping" is the transfer of patients who are
often ill, elderly, and in the (very costly) last few days of their
life to under-funded public hospitals like Cook County Hospital in
Chicago. Also, at the Federal level, the Federal Trade Commission has
insisted that the American Medical Association remove the statement
from its code of ethics that advertising is unethical and notify its
13
members of this change. Hospitals and health maintenance organiza-
tions are already advertising widely.
States are also moving gingerly toward efforts to use competition
to contain costs. Iowa and Illinois have established health care Cost
Containment Councils, for example, to increase consumer information
-9-
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on prices, necessary if competition is to be able to work.
Similarly, Massachusetts has released data relevant to the quality of
care and to fees for comparable procedures. Following California,
Illinois and Arizona are also trying new competitive bidding proce-
dures to serve Medicaid recipients.
However, most state licensure and certif icate-of-need legislation
is still in place. It is possible that with the greater influence of
trade associations at the state level, health care will follow the
earlier pattern established in the deregulation of trucking, with some
states preserving islands of state-sponsored monopoly under the guise
of (ineffective) economic regulation. However, there is increasing
awareness that excessive requirements for money capital, overly costly
standards for facilities, and licensure run up costs, as well as
growing reconsideration of the economic impact of certif icate-of-need
requirements and other barriers to entry. As the Federal Government
moves to dismantle the barriers to entry for which it has been respon-
sible, and as states move to expand the information about prices
available to consumers and to re-examine the barriers to entry that
remain at the state level, genuine competition is likely to grow rather
than diminish.
The New Competition
The new competition involves a combination of these two major
changes—the shift toward negotiating on the price beforehand, and the
reduction of barriers to entry.
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Since the Federal Government is a major purchaser of health ser-
vices, its shift to prospective reimbursement for Medicare patients
sets one significant part of the tone. Its steps to declare in advance
the price that it will pay by diagnosis for each of 469 Diagnostically
Related Groups (DRGs) is by now well-known, but some of the underlying
implications are less well understood. A key element is that perspec-
tive reimbursement forces hospitals to establish 469 accounting "cost
centers"—and then to allocate their costs to these 469 "bundles" of
final treatment-regimens that they sell. Because this kind of data was
never available before, within the hospital these 469 "product lines"
have never had a cost manager. The main task of managing costs pre-
viously has been centralized in Blue Cross/Blue Shield data banks for
use with the "cost based" reimbursement rates that they establish, as
well as in the state and national offices for Medicaid-Medicare. It is
these offices that have had the impossible task of monitoring the level
and the volume of procedures that they would reimburse for patients
they never saw. With "unbundled" separate charges for separate proce-
dures, the physician, who orders almost all of the services on behalf
of the patient, has operated unaware of costs. Without the information
about the total cost and cost/effectiveness of the treatments
prescribed for each diagnosis, and without the capacity to compare
those costs to the cost/effectiveness of treatments performed in
response to the same diagnosis by others, even if he did have the
incentive, he could hardly become an effective cost manager.
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The new steps by hospitals to collect data on the basis of the 469
cost centers is perhaps the most fundamental and revolutionary change
involved in the newly emerging health care system. It permits the
delegation of more power of a different kind to physicians, power to
become managers, power that had been centralized (and still is for pri-
vate and Medicaid patients) in those who enforce the reimbursement
regulations in private health insurance companies and in state govern-
ment offices. This decentralization of managerial decision-making
responsibility is a very new and different kind of power that many
physicians have not been trained to exercise. On whether or not it is
exercised wisely rests the fate of many clinics and hospitals.
The excess capacity in hospital beds now resulting from the advent
of DRGs is causing many hospitals to seek to eliminate local com-
petition by arranging for mergers. Except for the advantage in raising
funds nationally, there are not major cost advantages, after hospitals
reach a medium size. Although mergers may still be economically
advantageous to the hospital as local monopolies are created, there is
always the problem of violation of the antitrust laws and still higher
hospital prices as the result of the elimination of local competition.
Although some mergers of extremely small hospitials can be justifed on
cost grounds and can be induced by competition, many mergers that
result in local near-monopolies probably should be viewed as anti-
competitive moves designed to eliminate competition.
Many new forms of health care delivery have emerged in the wave of
the new competition. It's a regular alphabet soup—HMOs, IPAs , PPOs
,
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PCNs , Management Groups, and even some traditional fee-f or-service
clinics with surgi-center feeder networks.
HMO's—health care maintenance organizations—which agree before-
hand to provide comprehensive services for a single annual capitation
fee, are now growing in number very rapidly. Research on their
behavior by Luft, Liebowitz and others suggests that HMOs lower rates
18
of hospital admission and shorten lengths of stay. The result,
according to some hospital administrators, is about 40 percent cost
advantage, allowing them to consistently offer lower out-of-pocket
payments and larger benefits to those individuals choosing HMOs. Large
private insurance companies such as Prudential have become involved in
developing HMOs in Dallas, Austin, Nashville, Oklahoma City, Atlanta,
Chicago, and elsewhere. There are Maxicare state-wide networks, and
most of the larger hospitals and clinics in most cities have become
involved in setting up and advertising their own Personal Care,
Heartland Care, Carle Care, or Other Care HMOs.
IPAs—Independent Practice Associations—are looser knit groups
of physicians from the fee-f or-service sector who join together to bid
as providers of medical services for employer or state health plans.
Many of these do not have the internal management structures to manage
costs and therefore are less likely to be able to win bids and to sur-
vive in those localities where competition is more severe.
PPOs—Preferred Provider Organizations—are a new form of com-
petitive health plan negotiated with employers that offer financial
incentives to employees to go to designated "preferred providers,"
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that is, physicians and hospitals that have agreed to combine more cost
effective practice styles with lower fees. Employees are free to go to
whatever physician they choose, but at no out-of-pocket fee if they
choose preferred providers.
PCNs—Primary Care Networks—are a group of primary care physi-
cians, usually general practitioners, who agree to oversee the use of
medical services and monitor costs. They contract with hospitals, and
after selling their services for a prospective reimbursement rate, set
aside a fund called a "risk pool" to cover both specialists and
hospitialization.
Management Groups combine employers into groups to purchase
health insurance from the more cost effective providers. Because
employer benefit plans are very costly, large employers such as IBM,
Polaroid, John Deere, General Mills, Honeywell, and Caterpillar, have
begun to circumvent Blue Cross/Blue Shield and contract directly with
the more cost effective providers. This has caused Blue Cross/Blue
Shield to offer alternative options. Another result of this is a
boost to those plans that have abandoned f ee-f or-service in favor of
a prepaid capitation rate.
State governments, as mentioned earlier, are also beginning to
solicit competitive bids for serving Medicaid recipients on a capita-
19
tion basis. Following Medi-Cal in California, Arizona, which
formerly had no state Medicaid program, has now written Medicaid-HMO
contracts in all communities where there were two or more competitive
bids. Illinois has funded six large Medicaid-HMO contracts in Chicago.
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Experiments with Medicaid-HMOs are underway in several other states,
including the demonstration experiments funded by the Federal Health
Care Financing Administration in Florida, Missouri, and Minnesota.
A very large fraction of both Medicare and Medicaid costs goes for
long term care of the elderly in nursing homes. These services
include medical appliances, which can go as high as $195 per month to
rent, often for years, or to $2,000 for a padded wheelchair. Even after
the recent increases in Social Security taxes, the continuing rise in
health care costs for the elderly means that the Social Security trust
fund will be bankrupt by 1990 (as shown in Figure 1) even after the
effect of the 1983 increase in Social Security taxes is taken into
account
.
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Figure 1. Social Security Trust Fund Ratios
Source: Annual Trustees Report to Congress, as reported by Carolyne
Davis (1983, p. 13), the HCFA Administrator.
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Under these conditions it would appear virtually certain that the deci-
sion to proceed with DRGs will not be reversed. There are inevitable
adjustment strains, and problems with "diagnosis creep"; but DRGs are
beginning to reduce hospital utilization rates and hence slow down the
escalation of Medicare hospital costs.
HCFA furthermore is now experimenting with the extension of the
prepayment approach to Medicare and Medicaid-HMOs for long term nursing-
home care, important because long term care accounts for such a large
function of public health care costs. Some research problems remain to
be solved, especially with respect to how to share the risks and the
total fee among those admitted when the health condition of those
20
admitted differs widely. If these problem are solved, the HMO con-
cept is likely to be extended to long term nursing home care for Medi-
caid recipients shortly.
II. THE RATIONALE: HOW ARE COMPETITION AND
PREPAYMENT SUPPOSED TO WORK?
It first needs to be emphasized more strongly that the most impor-
tant kind of competition, the kind for which accurate information on
the price and quality of health care needs to be available, is the com-
petition among health plans . Competition after a person is sick is far
less meaningful—at that point he or she is not in a good position to
shop around. It is the competition by providers for the contract
during an annual enrollment period when employers are reconsidering
their health insurance contracts with alternative providers and
employees are selecting from a multiple choice among health insurance
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plans that competition is the most effective. It is in this situation
that the most cost-effective plans, which are likely to be those based
on prospective reimbursement, are gradually winning out.
The Rationale
But how is this combined effect of prepayment and competition,
together with the retention of some necessary minimum quality regula-
tions, supposed to work?
The combined effect may be illustrated in Figure 2. There the
curve CC illustrates the minimum cost of production at each given
quality-level of health care. Quality must be measured in terms of an
ordinal index with better quality reflecting greater health effec-
tiveness further to the right, and lesser quality to the left (without
the cardinal measure of exactly how much further between each quality
level). More quality of course incurs more costs, so the cost curve
slopes upward to the right. Eventually, however, more dollars do less
and less to increase the health effectiveness of the care, and the
curve becomes vertical. That is, diminishing returns set in as expen-
ditures for treating a given diagonsis increase. Eventually additional
outlays of cost simply do not increase further the true quality of
care, and with the complications that arise with medical procedures,
additional outlays and procedures could even eventually reduce the
health effectiveness of the care.
In principle, health services may be provided at any combination
of quality and cost located on or above the curve CC. However in
-17-
practice certain combinations must be ruled out. Minimum quality
regulations rule out the entire area to the left of the vertical line
in Figure 2—inadequate nursing homes, untrained health care pro-
fessionals, and unsanitary hospital conditions. Regulations of this
type will always be needed, and hence a blend between regulation and
competition can reasonably be expected to be a permanent feature of
c -
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Figure 2. Abandonment of Cost-Based Reimbursement
the new competition. The kind of regulations being eliminated at the
Federal level, such as certificates of need, and extraordinary initial
requirements for HMO plans, are those that set up excessive barriers
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to entry and thereby serve to foster monopoly. At the state level,
few regulations of this type have been dismantled, and as mentioned
trade-association influence remains very strong. This may permit the
perpetuation of anti-competitve economic regulation and of islands of
monopoly in some states for many years to come.
The most severe current problems are illustrated in the area to
the right of the minimum quality regulations and above the cost curve
CC. Here, as discussed above, cost-plus reimbursement, much like the
cost-plus contracts in nuclear plant construction, provide incentives
to all providers to run up the costs. The area of excess costs, Area B
in Figure 2, is without an upper bound for most episodes of medical
treatment, since additional costs can be added in and passed on to the
insurance company, or the government. Furthermore, the red tape is not
only unpleasant to providers, regulators, and to patients, but the
large amount of paper work required is also costly and wasteful.
Prospective reimbursement via DRGs is not a form of regulation
which involves use of laws and the police power of the state, but
instead a use of market power on the demand side by the government
to reach a price agreement between buyer and seller before services are
rendered. Health maintenance organizations also reimburse prospectively
rather than retrospectively. But in the latter case the stipulated
price covers preventive care, ambulatory care, and full-service hospital
care. As Medicare DRG's are "bundled" to produce a single price for
full service coverage they will approach a prospective reimbursement
HMO basis. With negotiation beforehand to fix a price for bundles of
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services there is a stronger incentive to bring costly technology and
other costs under control. The result of combining minimum quality
regulations with the abandonment of cost based reimbursement would be
to place an upper bound on the feasible region in Figure 2, limiting it
to Area A—that is, to good quality care, but at pre-negotiated cost.
However, reasonable prospective reimbursement rates require that
there be competitive bidding among health care insurance plans. So as
shown in Figure 3, the new competition is designed to limit the
feasible region further, providing a curved upper bound symbolizing the
discipline of the market. Curve MM' is a total revenue curve based on
the final effective demand from both public and private insurance plans
(assuming that now all patients, rather than just Medicare patients, are
included in the analysis). This new competition—the crux of which is
among health care plans offered by HMO's and other health insurance
providers is intended to provide disincentives to those providing the
lowest quality care at the highest cost (Area F in Figure 3). The
largest opportunities to grow, and largest net revenues, are available
to those operating at the most cost-effective point, point E. The
positive incentives (net revenues) are much smaller for those providing
the lower quality care at high cost, below F, although a few may be able
to survive, especially in those states that retain protective anti-
competitive legislation. The net revenue will also be smaller for
those who provide costly increments to health care that do not contri-
bute significantly to health effectiveness up near point M' . Their high
costs are not being covered, and survival of these providers will be in
jeopardy.
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Increasing the intensity of competition beyond that shown in
Figure 3 would have the effect of shifting the curve MM (representing
the discipline of the market) downward. This would further limit the
feasible region and squeeze more of the providers toward the area
around the single most cost-effective range near E.
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Figure 3. Rationalization of Health Care Delivery
Requirement of Multiple Choice
When employers are required to provide a multiple choice to their
employees of several health insurance plans, at least one of which
uses prospective reimbursement, the result is to encourage competition
-21-
among plans. Multiple choice also encourages the creation of
prospective-reimbursement plans in localities now lacking them. It
enables employees to compare and to choose the more cost-effective
plan, i.e., either the plan that offers the greatest benefits, or the
one that has lower out-of-pocket costs, or one that balances these
features. Enactment of the requirement that employers go a step
further and rebate some fraction of the cost saving to those choosing
the more cost-effective health plans would drastically increase the
amount of competition because it would alert employees and give them a
strong incentive to compare plans. This is a step that the Federal
Government has not as yet been willing to take.
To make competition more effective, it is now the state-level
economic regulations that bar entry and foster monopoly that next would
need to be sharply reduced. State certif icate-of-need legislation and
state licensing requirements need to be reduced. If state cost-based
Medicaid reimbursement also were eliminated, empty hospital beds that
now can be used to raise Blue Cross cost-based rates would instead
become a strong deterrent to increasing hospital room rates. Instead
of raising rates to pass on the costs, the empty beds would be an
incentive to hospital managers to lower rates to attract additional
business from employers. Underutilized technology also would be
avoided in favor of technology that could either reduce costs, be fully
utilized, or both, and therefore be more cost effective. Increased
admission to medical schools, rather than the decreasing enrollments
that are now occurring, would continue to restrict the rise in physi-
cians' incomes, which are already rising more slowly due to the
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increased supply, while also continuing to increase the supply of
physicians to the underserved rural areas. Reduced barriers to nurse
practitioners, who can perform a range of the more standard and simpler
medical treatments and refer other cases to specialists, would also
help lower costs. In these ways the states could greatly help to
reduce cost escalation and, instead of being part of the cost-
escalation problem, become part of the solution.
III. INEQUITY: THE BIGGEST CRACK IN
THE EMERGING SYSTEM
As competition increases, the discretion available to non-profit
institutions to serve those whose insurance is inadequate and who are
unable to pay is squeezed. The working poor who are ineligible for
Medicaid and yet are underinsured are increasingly denied access or are
forced onto the already overcrowded public hospitals.
About 90 percent of all short-term hospital beds are in not-for-
profit institutions of the type that dominate the health care industry.
As these institutions meet competition, their traditional roles of
serving the poor and of providing care in an environment where
patients have little information comes under increasing pressure.
Largely as a result of this pressure, cracks in the newly emerging
system are beginning to appear.
Some of the kinds of government policies that are needed quickly
to deal with these cracks cost money. They therefore may not be
considered until the new competition succeeds in saving some current
resources through increased efficiency. Nevertheless, if the system is
to remain humane, grants are needed for the working poor to help them
-23-
cover at least a fraction of the annual premium in a prospective-
21
reimbursement health plan. Hospitals currently caring for a dispro-
portionate share of the indigent, mostly in the larger city ghetto
areas, are being brought under very serious pressure and are under
increasing risk of bankruptcy.
The cost of the health care vouchers needed to relieve this pressure
can be reduced by relating the size of the voucher in what could be
called a new Healthcare system to the recipient's ability to pay, as
measured by his income. This procedure is far less costly since it
allows for some resource recovery. It also simultaneously diminishes
sharp distinctions between private patients who pay all of their own
way and Medicaid patients who pay nothing but must first prove that
they are totally destitute. This step would meet the most acute
current need without running into the objection of applying ability-to-
pay tests to Medicare recipients who have previously paid into the
Social Security Trust Fund. There exist very sophisticated methods in
wide use for "financial need analysis" for use with college tuition
waivers and grants. A one-page form, requiring the recipient to copy a
few lines from his last income tax return, could be sent to a central
processing center to produce a timely report of the patient's unmet
need. This report then could be used directly to determine the size of
the grant that is provided and simultaneously the patient's expected
22
contribution to his health care costs.
This simple procedure is far less costly than providing free care
to all who are eligible. It makes sense for those above the Medicaid
threshold. If Medicare also were to be means-tested in this way,
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additional problems are raised but the huge savings then be more than
enough to fund at no additional cost to the taxpayers a new Healthcare
system for the working poor who are eligible neither for Medicare nor
Medicaid. It is this in-between group who are currently being dumped
out of the for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals.
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS
Prospective reimbursement that involves a capitation rate covering
the entire health of the patient is requiring greater attention to
cost management and the cost effectiveness of different alternative
treatments (e.g., hospitalization vs. outpatient care) by physicians
and nurses. This change in incentives in turn implies the need for
greater attention to the cost-effectiveness training of new physicians
in the medical schools, and training that increases their awareness of
the nature of the new competition. Training in cost-effectiveness is
likely to put the health professional who possesses it at a premium.
Those physicians who have not learned how to combine medical inputs in
cost-effective (and health effective) ways are likely to be under
increasing discomfort in the hospitals in which they practice.
Those professionals on hospital boards and clinic boards need to
alert their institutions to the need to meet the competition by offering
prepaid health plans if they are not already doing so. Physicians are
also likely to continue to combine in groups to bid for contracts with
employers. Those remaining in solo practice or on a fee-f or-service
basis are likely to come under increasing economic pressure as they
serve a declining share of the market and are not positioned to bid
for new business.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The newly emerging health care system shows promise of reducing
cost escalation. There is acute need, however, to use part of the
savings to help maintain access to health care by the working poor,
the unemployed, the underemployed, and the uninsured.
Achieving these combined goals requires a continuing shift away
from cost-based reimbursement and toward prospective reimbursement.
When combined with the emergence of competition, this new competition
is likely to strongly encourage physicians to practice in larger
groups, as well as lead to hospital and hospital clinic mergers.
A shift of power is occurring that decentralizes the decisions
about the quantity of hospital days and other health care inputs used
from state and insurance-company administrators to physicians. This is
a more appropriate locus for this power, since the physician has the
patients' needs in view. It is necessary, however, that the physician
be at risk for wasting resources, as is the case under prospective
reimbursement, and that physicians be more adequately trained to make
these kind of management decisions.
State-level economic regulations that continue to bar entry and
foster monopoly power need to be reexamined and reduced if states wish
to join in using the competitive approach to reduce the escalation of
costs. Medicaid also needs to shift over to prospective reimburse-
ment as the results of the experiments in process come in.
The result, after an adjustment period, should be a health-care
system with incentives to operate both more health effectively and
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much more cost effectively. Prepayment also implies stronger incen-
tives to provide preventive care and not just crisis care. Such a
system also should be more satisfactory to providers, who will
encounter less waste, less red tape, and more independent respon-
sibility. It then has the potential if new legislation is passed to
be more equitable and humane in using the savings realized by the new
competition to provide health care for those working poor who are
increasingly being denied adequate access.
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Footnotes
Ibid.
"Victor R. Fuchs (1985).
2.
3
The Medical Care Price Index components in the Consumer Price
Index published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1985).
See, for example, Feldstein (1983), Fuchs (1985) and Davis
(1983).
Feldstein (1983, p. 92) surveys a number of studies which conclude
that the rate of surgical procedures is higher when the physician is
reimbursed on a fee-f or-service basis.
In a study of over 11,000 consultations, it was consistently shown
that "33% of those voluntarily seeking a second opinion and roughly 18%
of those required to seek a second opinion consultation were not con-
firmed for surgery by a board-certified panel consultant." The highest
rate of nonconf irmation was for hysterectomies, prostatectomies,
bunionectomies, and knee surgery. See McCarthy et al (1981).
Medical care prices and insurance rates continue to rise at a 6%
annual rate in 1985 as shown by the Medical Care Services Price Index,
Monthly Labor Review
,
Bureau of Labor Statistics (1985), p. 73.
o
This and the preceding illustration are implications of
Feldstein's (1983, p. 130-4) analysis.
9
See McMahon and Blumberg (1985).
See Carolyne Davis (1983) for example.
U
See Goldfarb (1975).
12
The information is based on inquiries made by the physicians in
charge of the Admissions department at Cook County Hospital in Chicago
who feel under pressure as other Chicago hospitals dump patients onto
Cook County Hospital.
13
Regarding the American Medical Association, 94 FTC 701 (1979)
modified and enforced by 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980) affirmed by the
Court 452 US 960 (1982) (per curiam).
14
See the "Illinois Health Reform Act" enacted by the State of
Illinois in 1984, and patterned to some extent on the Iowa law, that
sets up a Cost Containment Council with this charge.
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See McMahon and Blumberg (1985) for further description of these
developments
.
1
See Ralph Berry (1967).
See Punch and Johnson (1984).
I Q
Harold Luft (1980) and Manning, Liebowitz et al. (1985).
19
See McMahon and Blumberg (1985).
20
See Thomas et al (1983). Steven Wallach in Boston has been
actively working on this problem.
21
See National Center for Health Services Research (1985).
22
See, for example, the description of the American College
Testing Program's (1985) financial need analysis criteria and methods.
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